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Background: Perceived control is strongly linked to healthy outcomes, mental healthiness, and psychological well-being. This
is particularly important when people have little control over things that are happening to them. Perceived control studies have
been performed extensively in laboratory settings and show that perceived control can be increased by experimental manipulations.
Although these studies suggest that it may be possible to improve people’s mental health by increasing their perceived control,
there is very little evidence to date to suggest that perceived control can also be influenced in the real world.
Objective: The first aim of this study was to test for evidence of a link between noncontrol situations and psychological well-being
in the real world using a mobile phone app. The second and arguably more important aim of the study was to test whether a simple
instructional intervention on the nature of alternative causes would enhance people’s perceptions of their own control in these
noncontrol situations.
Methods: We implemented a behavioral action-outcome contingency judgment task using a mobile phone app. An opportunity
sample of 106 healthy volunteers scoring low (n=56, no depression) or high (n=50, mild depression) on a depression scale
participated. They were given no control over the occurrence of a low- or high-frequency stimulus that was embedded in everyday
phone interactions during a typical day lasting 8 hours. The intervention involved instructions that either described a consistent
alternative cause against which to assess their own control, or dynamic alternative causes of the outcome. Throughout the day,
participants rated their own control over the stimulus using a quantitative judgment scale.
Results: Participants with no evidence of depression overestimated their control, whereas those who were most depressed were
more accurate in their control ratings. Instructions given to all participants about the nature of alternative causes significantly
affected the pattern of perceived control ratings. Instructions describing discrete alternative causes enhanced perceived control
for all participants, whereas dynamic alternative causes were linked to less perceived control.
Conclusions: Perceptions of external causes are important to perceived control and can be used to enhance people’s perceptions.
Theoretically motivated interventions can be used to enhance perceived control using mobile phone apps. This is the first study
to do so in a real-world setting.
(JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2018;6(11):e10114)   doi:10.2196/10114
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Perceived control is critical to health outcomes, mental
healthiness, and psychological well-being. For example,
numerous studies have measured perceived personal control
using psychometric questionnaire measures and have shown
direct relationships to health outcomes (eg, cancer [1], diabetes
[2], heart disease [3], and treatment adherence and effectiveness
[4]), with control mediating the negative consequences of
adverse conditions [5]. A key idea is that when healthy people
have no control over events, they tend towards an “illusory”
perception of control (eg, [6]). This is thought of as a protective
bias that supports people’s sense of control, and therefore
well-being, when they cannot control things that are happening
to them (eg, [7]). Conversely, people with depression are held
to recognize situations in which they have no control all too
well [8]. This “depressive realism” phenomenon may represent
the absence of a healthy protective mechanism, with illusory
control being an ingredient for positive physical and mental
health [9,10]. Given the importance of perceived control for
health, the aim of the current study was to assess for evidence
of this phenomenon outside of the laboratory using a mobile
phone app and to test whether a simple theoretically motivated
intervention could enhance people’s perceptions of control in
a healthy manner.
Previous Research
Despite its importance, perceived control research suffers from
a lack of studies carried out in real-world or applied settings.
So far, laboratory-based research has been the only method of
showing whether a person perceives that they have control when
there is none. This is because the actual control a person has
over a situation needs to be known and adjustable by the
experimenter, and an accurate, objective measure of people’s
experiences is required [11], which is almost never the case in
the real world. Some methodologies used in this domain, for
example, comparisons between self and observer ratings of a
situation [12] or between personal and population risk (eg, of
a cancer diagnosis [13]), have provided useful insight but cannot
allow a definitive diagnosis of illusory perceived control.
An objective measure of available control is clearly present in
laboratory tasks involving “contingency judgments” as
participants are exposed to carefully measured contingencies
between their actions and outcomes [11]. The contingencies
between a person’s actions and subsequent outcomes are defined
using four event-outcome frequencies (Figure 1):
a. a user action is followed by an outcome
b. a user action is not followed by an outcome
c. no action by the user is followed by an outcome
d. no action by the user is not followed by an outcome (ie, no
actions and no outcomes)
These events are usually programmed to occur over a short
period of time and are quantified using the normative delta P
(ΔP) metric [14]. Delta P is the difference between P (O|A),
the probability of a user action (A) being followed by an
outcome (O) and P (O|~A), the probability of the same outcome
occurring when the user does not perform the action. Positive
and negative ΔP values indicate the user has a certain control
over the outcome, though in the case of a negative ΔP the
outcome will be more likely to occur when there is no action
by the user. A ΔP value equal to zero indicates the user cannot
control the outcome through the action. In both of the specific
examples given in Figure 1, the person has no control over
salient outcomes (ΔP=0) but the frequency or density of
outcomes varies from low to high (ie, low outcome density,
high outcome density). Therefore, if accurate, people’s
perceptions of control should not differ between these two
conditions. However, numerous studies have shown that healthy
people exposed to a high outcome density condition tend to
overestimate their control relative to the low outcome density
condition (eg, [15]) and relative to people who are depressed
(eg, [8,16]). These findings have provided evidence for the link
between illusory control and healthy states.
However, the requirement for careful experimental control
means that the basic experimental findings have never been
tested outside the laboratory. This raises key methodological
concerns around external and ecological validity, of
generalizability from one very specific control situation to the
whole of life [17] and the difference between behavior instructed
in the laboratory and that occurring naturally in the real world
[18]. Such basic methodological critiques of perceived control
research are well acknowledged [19] and have limited the
potential for this area of research to result in interventions for
applied settings, although laboratory-based interventions have
begun to be tested [20].
Where laboratory research has been helpful is in shedding light
on our understanding of the psychological processes
underpinning perceived control and, theoretically, the factors
that will enhance perceptions if used to formulate interventions.
So, for example, we know that the perception of alternative
causes of outcomes is a key moderator of perceived control
[14,21]. Whether a rule-based normative model [14] or a
process-based associative model [21] is preferred, one’s own
control is evaluated against the control exerted by alternative
causes. Other potential controlling causes are numerous, both
inside and outside the laboratory, and include the environment
or context in which events occur. For example, if a person
wanted to control the heat level in a room using heating controls
(action), an important alternative cause of heat variation would
be the room itself and the effectiveness of the central heating
system therein. In other words, the context is a key
conditionalizer of control experience [22] and has been indicated
as a key factor that discriminates healthy and mildly depressed
people in their control perceptions [16]. These findings should
theoretically [21] lend themselves to interventions that will
influence people’s perceptions of alternative causes and enhance
their feelings of control [20].
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Figure 1. Generic (a) and specific (b) contingency relationships between the occurrence of an action and the occurrence of an outcome in conditions
(b) in which there is "no control’"over the outcome. NB. The term "outcome density" (OD) refers to the probability of an outcome occurring over all
events, P(O).
Study Goals
Given the ubiquity of mobile phones in everyday life, and their
potential as data gathering and intervention devices, the goals
of this study were to investigate perceived control in the
participant’s normal everyday environment and to test potential
interventions that may increase a participant’s perceived control,
whether or not they are depressed.
To this end, we implemented a contingency judgment control
task designed to run on Android mobile phones using the same
conditions displayed in Figure 1. In order to maximize ecological
validity, we used two strategies. First, experimental trials were
embedded into participants’ everyday lives through user-phone
interactions programmed to take place throughout the activities
a participant would experience during a typical day (see Figure
2). Second, the user-phone interactions were modeled on very
typical activities, such as when the phone user is alerted to the
availability of new information (eg, a message), which is
followed up by an action (eg, click to access) and an outcome
(eg, message, picture, video). Thus, in our procedure, each trial
was prompted by a standard Android alert message and consisted
of a user action followed by the occurrence of a brief auditory
stimulus or no auditory stimulus at the programmed probability.
We also asked participants to rate their control over the auditory
outcome at five time points throughout the day. Ratings were
performed by scrolling a wheel to a value between -100 and
100, with -100 indicating a perception of complete preventative
control and +100 indicating complete generative control. Note
that such ratings can be mapped onto the programmed ΔP
metric.
In addition, we programmed an intervention by manipulating
the instructions given to participants about the nature of
alternative causes of the auditory stimulus. We defined the
alternative cause as a discrete, static entity constantly present
throughout the task (ie, the mobile phone network) or as a
dynamic entity that changed throughout the day (ie, the different
places they visited during the day). This is important because,
theoretically, there is a finite amount of causal control available
to any given outcome [14,21]. This means that if one cause is
seen as a strong “controller,” it is at the expense of all other
potential causes, which will be seen as weak “controllers” of
the outcome. Any cause that is constantly present (discrete
context cause), especially when the outcome is absent, will be
seen as a very weak controller, with other causes seeing their
control enhanced. Therefore, we predict that participants in the
discrete condition will see their actions as strong controllers of
the outcome, and the extent of this control will be simply linked
to the frequency with which the outcome occurs. The latter will
increase the difference in control judgments between the low
and high frequency conditions. Conversely, dynamic and
therefore multiple alternative causes will have the opposite
effect. We predict that people will learn as much about each
cause as they do about the action. With causal control shared
between so many potential causes, all of them will be perceived
as weak, and the illusory control will be reduced (see also [16]).
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Figure 2. Contingency judgment task implemented as user-phone interactions, including action and auditory outcome stimulus, with control ratings
given after every block of 8 interactions (trials).
To date, mobile devices have been used as data gatherers and
to deliver therapy and interventions for numerous conditions
(eg, depression [23]). Here, we also study the effects of levels
of depressed mood because even minor elevations, so called
mild depression [8], dysphoria [16], or even scores above the
median on a depression scale [24], can have a significant impact
on control perceptions. In this study, in order to test a random
sample of the population and examine the effects of depression
levels, we use the median as the cut-off score on the depression
scale. Importantly, although mobile devices have been used
very successfully to support healthy behavior change (eg,
exercise [25]) and to promote healthy eating [26], they have
never been used to assess or promote a general sense of control.
Our study will be the first to do this.
Methods
Recruitment
Participants consisted of 106 university students who
volunteered to participate by responding to an email
advertisement and fulfilled the inclusion criteria: (1) access to
an Android mobile phone and (2) over the age of 17. Volunteers
completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) [27] during a
visit to the laboratory after which they were supervised in
downloading and installing the mobile app.
On the basis of their BDI scores, participants were categorized
as members of the low BDI group (BDI ≤5, n=56, female n=27,
representing non-depression) or high BDI group (BDI >5, n=50,
female n=36, representing mild depression). This cut-off value
for group categorization has been used in other similar studies
examining the effects of mild depression or dysphoria on
contingency learning and represents the median BDI score in
most samples [24,28]. Throughout this paper, we refer to high
BDI groups or mild depression in order to describe and explain
our findings.
Table 1 shows that the BDI groups produced significantly higher
scores on other depression relevant scales, including anxiety
and stress, specifically the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
(DASS). Given nonrandom assignment to BDI groups, we
attempted to match these BDI groups on three characteristics
relevant to performance on cognitive tasks and which are
affected by levels of depression: age, IQ, and short-term memory
capacity (see Measures section). We checked for any statistical
differences between groups on these three measures. Thus, the
groups were matched on age and estimated IQ scores [29] but
not short-term memory capacity, as measured by digit span
scores [30] (Table 1).
Design
This study used a mixed 2×2×2×(5) factorial design, in which
the between-groups variables were BDI group (2: low BDI,
high BDI), outcome density (2: low, high), and alternative cause
instructions (discrete, dynamic). The repeated measures variable
was judgment block (5: 1-5). Participants made ratings of the
control their actions had over the occurrence of the outcome.
These were made using a +100 (complete control) through 0
(no control) to -100 (preventative control) scale, presented to
the participant as a wheel (Figure 2). In addition, we recorded
the number of actions made by each participant and calculated
the contingency (actual ΔP) and outcome density experienced
(based on the number and types of trials experienced), and the
number of trials missed.
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Table 1. Participant characteristics for each BDI group.









aBDI: Beck Depression Inventory.
bdf=1, 104.
cDASS: Depression Anxiety Stress Scales.
Measures
Participants completed the BDI; the DASS [31]; the digit span
test, which provides a measure of short-term memory capacity;
an estimated measure of pre-morbid IQ; and a number of other
demographic items. Briefly, the digit span test requires
participants to retain and repeat a randomized series of digits
read to them at a rate of one per second. For the purposes of
this study, the test was computerized. IQ was estimated using
a formula applied to demographic variables. These measures
are described in detail elsewhere [32]. In addition, participants
completed a perception of control task, that was administered
using a mobile phone.
Perception of Control Task
The task was implemented using an app developed using an
Android library for the context-aware delivery of messages to
users’ mobile devices [33]. The app required wireless or network
connectivity with the server initially in order for randomization
to groups to take place and the experimental condition settings
to be downloaded to the phone. Once this was complete, the
app functioned independently and did not require continuous
wireless or network connectivity. Incremental data upload to
the server was programmed to take place as soon as connectivity
was available, both during the task and once the task was
finished.
The task was implemented as a discrete trials contingency
judgment task, including 40 experimental trials lasting 6 seconds
each, divided by intertrial intervals lasting on average 12 minutes
(calculated using the Fleshler-Hoffman progression [34]). Each
trial was prompted by a standard Android “notification” message
(similar to those delivered to alert a user that a text message has
arrived and is waiting to be read) that included a brief auditory
and visual signal. A time limit of 2 minutes was given for
participants to access the alert, after which the trial would be
categorized as a “miss.” Under these circumstances, the alert
would be removed from the screen and the next intertrial interval
would commence. This procedure was used to ensure that the
procedure lasted for the same duration for all participants. If
the participant accessed the alert within the 2-minute time frame,
the onscreen button would appear on the screen in 2 seconds.
They would then have the opportunity to press a touch-screen
button for 3 seconds. Whether or not the button was pressed
within 3 seconds, an auditory outcome would sound for 1 second
(outcome present), or it would not sound (outcome absent),
depending on the programmed probability. Following each of
these experimental trials, the intertrial interval would commence.
Action-outcome contingencies were programmed as in Figure
1. Participants were either randomized to the low outcome
density group (P [O|A]=.25, P [O|A]=.25) or the high outcome
density group (P [O|A]=.75, P [O|A]=.75). Therefore, for all
participants, the programmed contingency was zero, and they
had no control over the sound’s occurrence. Every 8 trials, the
participant would be asked to rate their own control using the
previously described wheel (Figure 2). The procedure was
programmed to last for approximately 8 hours and function
during the participants’ typical day, in a similar manner to
typical mobile phone interactions.
Procedure
After having been fully briefed on arrival at the lab and having
given informed consent, participants were asked for their
demographic details, completed a series of questionnaires about
their mood, and performed the digit span test. Following this,
the experimenter helped participants download the app onto
their own mobile phone and guided them through installing and
activating the app. Once the app was activated, the participant
was prompted to enter a code that would act as a unique
identifier to allow matching of lab- and app-generated data.
Following this, the instructions (Multimedia Appendix 1) were
presented and participants told that they would interact with the
phone during the course of the day, which would be
opportunities to test if their button pressing controlled the sound
occurrence. Following each block of 8 trials and the
corresponding control rating, participants received an
intervention message to prompt the participant to consider the
influence of their context on their control. In the “discrete”
condition, participants were told to think about the “control
external factors have...this could be factors related to the phone,
the mobile network or anything apart from your actions.” In the
dynamic context condition, participants were asked to think
about “control the place you are located in has...It’s important
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to note that you will change your location throughout the day.
The place you are in could affect whether the boing sound
occurs, regardless of your actions.” When the procedure was
complete, the app provided debriefing information and links to
support information provided on a webpage.
Power
We conducted a priori power analyses, which indicated that a
sample of 152 was required for a power of 0.8 to detect
medium-sized between-group effects and a sample of 24 and
48 to detect repeated measures effects and interactions
respectively. However, only 106 volunteers kept appointments
at the laboratory to participate in the study. Based on the
achieved sample size, compromise power to detect the repeated
measures effects and interactions, which were the focus of our
theoretical predictions, was high (>.99). The power to detect
main effects of between-group variables was somewhat lower
than we planned (0.70). In spite of this, the size of the key main
effects was within the 90% confidence limits (BDI) leading us
to conclude that this study provided an adequately powered test
of the hypotheses.
Due to participants’ completing the task at the same time as
their everyday activities, we anticipated missing data, in terms
of trials and ratings, as well as issues such as loss of mobile
phone battery. In this dataset, 10.6% of judgment values were
missing. We therefore carried out multiple imputation, which
involves replacing missing data with values generated from a
series of multiple regression analyses including standard error
and available parameter estimates. The fifth and most
conservative iteration was used for the analyses reported in this
paper.
Perception of Control Task Validation
As this is the first time a contingency task has been tested
outside the laboratory, it was important to track all user-phone
interactions and report whether experience was in line with what
we had programmed. On average, participants missed 11.4 trials
(SE 0.79) of the programmed 40 and, as instructed, pressed the
button on around half of the trials they engaged with (press
proportion mean 0.58, SE 0.019). The actual contingency (ΔP)
experienced was again close to 0 as programmed (mean 0.04,
SE 0.02). Participants in the low outcome density condition
experienced outcomes on an average of 11.7 trials out of 40
(29.2%, SE 2.7%) whereas participants in the high outcome
density condition experienced outcomes on 27.7 trials out of
40 (69.2%, SE 2.5%). Overall, the recorded engagement with
experimental trials and contingency experience was as we
programmed.
Results
In order to test the hypotheses, that (1) illusory control and
depressive realism effects would be present, and (2) that the
intervention would enhance ratings of control, a mixed factorial
analysis of variance (Multimedia Appendix 2), which included
actual ΔP experience as a covariate, was carried out on
judgments of control. The alpha level was held at .05 throughout
all analyses unless stated otherwise.
Illusory Control and Depression Effects
There are two tests to demonstrate the presence or absence of
an illusory control effect. The simplest and first test assumes
that judgments that are different to zero represent illusory
control. In this test, the higher the absolute number of the rating,
the stronger the illusion of control. The second and more
rigorous test assumes that people’s subjective perception of
control scale might differ from the numeric scale on which they
are asked to rate it and that positioning of ratings on the
judgment scale is rather arbitrary. Therefore, the second test of
illusory control is to compare ratings of two conditions (low
and high outcome density) that have the same contingency.
Here, we carried out both tests simultaneously using the
multifactorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) and follow-up
tests.
On average, low BDI participants showed the illusion of control.
They rated their control as 14.90 (SE 5.37), whereas high BDIs
rated their control as nearer to zero (mean 1.16, SE 5.98). This
main effect of BDI group was significant and confirmed that
low BDI groups produced reliably higher ratings of control than
participants with higher levels of depression: F1,91=4.05, mean
squared error (MSE) 6671.40, P=.047, partial eta square=0.04,
90% CL 0.0004-0.1271. Subsequent single samples t tests
comparing ratings to a criterion accuracy value of 0 showed
that, for low BDI participants, 4 out of 5 action ratings were
significantly higher than 0, all ts>2, all Ps<.05, evidencing
illusory control. For more dysphoric, high BDI participants, 5
out of 5 action ratings were not reliably different to 0, all
ts<1.16, and all Ps>.25. However, the BDI by outcome density
interaction was not reliable (F1,91=0.63, MSE 6671.40, P=.43,
partial eta square=0.0007), showing that the low BDI trend
towards larger absolute ratings was not only evident in high
outcome density conditions. This shows that non-depressed
participants tended toward perceiving that they had more control
over the occurrence of the auditory stimulus than depressed
participants did whose ratings represented lower levels of
perceived control.
Alternative Cause Intervention Effect
Figure 3 suggests that, as we predicted, instructions on the nature
of the alternative cause enhanced perceptions of control. Only
when participants were instructed that the alternative cause was
a discrete entity did they show evidence of the healthy illusory
control.
The analysis described above supported this observation because
the interaction between instructions and outcome density was
reliable: F1,91=7.05, MSE 6671.40, P=.009, partial eta
square=.07, 90% CL 0.01-0.1674. Follow-up simple effects
analyses confirmed this pattern and showed that the high
outcome density conditions received higher ratings than low
outcome density conditions only with discrete cause instructions
(F1,91=6.06, MSE 1334.28, P=.02, partial eta square=.062, 90%
CL 0.0064-0.1548) and not with dynamic cause instructions
(F1,91=1.85, MSE 1334.28, P=.18, partial eta square=.02, 90%
CL 0-0.0887).
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of control as a function of outcome density, Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) group and alternative cause intervention (error
bars correspond to standard errors of the mean).
These findings show that perceived control can be increased by
providing people with simple instructions about the nature of
alternative causes. Participants who compared their own control
to discrete alternative causes produced higher control ratings.
Discussion
Principal Considerations
We used a mobile phone app in order to embed and measure
perceived control occurring in participants’ everyday lives as
naturalistic mobile phone interactions. The app was designed
such that participants’ actions had no control over the occurrence
of an auditory stimulus. Participants without signs of depression
overestimated their control, whereas participants showing mild
levels of depression rated their control as close to zero. This
study provides the first objective demonstration of illusory
control and depressive realism in a real-world setting.
Until now, the basic experimental findings of illusory control
have never been rigorously tested outside the laboratory. This
has raised important methodological and theoretical concerns,
in particular around external and ecological validity, of
generalizability from one very specific control situation to the
whole of life [17] and of the difference between behavior
instructed in the laboratory and that occurring naturally in the
real world [18]. Such basic methodological critiques of
perceived control research are well acknowledged in relation
to depression [19] but not really discussed in the general health
literature in which the concept of control is so frequently used.
This gap has limited how our theoretical understanding of
illusory control can be extrapolated to develop interventions,
such as that described and tested here.
Notably, the instruction intervention significantly influenced
all participants’ ratings of control. As we predicted, when the
alternative cause was described as a discrete, constantly present
entity (the mobile phone network), people judged that they had
more control when the auditory stimulus occurred frequently
(eg, [15]). Conversely, when people were informed that
alternative causes were dynamic (ie, place) and would change
throughout the experience, there was no evidence of illusory
control effect. This finding suggests that the intervention used
in this study, which was based on theoretical accounts of how
people use alternative causes to evaluate their own control
[14,21] was effective and successful.
This finding is consistent with work that shows that the
perceived strength [28], salience [35], or exposure [16] of
alternative causes, such as the context or other causes, competes
with the cause under consideration for perceived control [15].
However, several things are important to note for those
interested in designing perceived control interventions because
the direction of the change in perceived control will depend on
a number of key factors. First, the degree of control actually
present in a situation is critical. When the person does have
control, a strong alternative cause will reduce perceived control
[28]. Second, the effect of any intervention or experimental
manipulation, which changes the salience of or exposure to the
alternative cause, will depend on what the person learns about
the alternative cause as a result. So, for example, Vadillo et al
[35] introduced a “difficult to ignore” alternative cause into
their laboratory procedure, which seemed more strongly related
to the outcome than participants’ actions. Msetfi et al [16]
introduced a long delay into the procedure during the time that
the alternative cause was present. This allowed participants to
learn that the alternative cause was only weakly related to the
outcome, which boosted their own perception of control. Both
of these findings show how circumstances and information,
which are present, can differentially influence people’s
perceptions of their own control in very similar “no control”
situations. This is critical information for those working in the
health space, as perception of control is a very important
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mediator of health outcomes [4], which can be influenced
unintentionally, as well as through intervention.
Strengths and Limitations
It is important to consider whether the experimental procedure
was a valid test of the contingencies that we planned for
participants to experience. This is because it has been
acknowledged that changes in participant behavior can actually
affect the contingencies they are exposed to [18,24,36]. Our
concern here was missed trials. However, careful scrutiny of
the data recorded on each trial showed that even though
participants missed some trials, they experienced the
contingencies as programmed. This alleviates an important
concern.
Another limitation is that our implementation of the contingency
judgment task was an extremely crude analogue of real-life
user–mobile phone interactions. However, in this first test of
illusory control and depressive realism outside the laboratory,
it was important to implement a real-life contingency task that
was as similar as possible to lab procedures in order to provide
the replication required. Our future studies will not only be able
to provide a more sophisticated and naturalistic interface but
will also collect richer data, including concurrent natural
activities and behaviors, as well as mood and well-being ratings
over longer periods of time. We also note that we have used
similar nonclinical BDI criteria to test for depressive realism as
the majority of the key studies in the literature [8,16]. This
means that the generalizability of our findings to clinical
depression is questionable, and we make no strong claims in
this regard other than to state that we have replicated other
depressive realism findings as tested elsewhere in the real world.
While we acknowledge the limitations of our study, especially
in relation to the relatively controlled nature of the user-phone
interactions we designed, a theoretically important aspect of
ecological validity has been introduced into the procedure. This
is the nature of the context or the alternative cause, which is
fundamentally different in the laboratory to the dynamic,
constantly changing contexts of real-world control situations.
To date, most human learning studies simulate context using
discrete cues [37] or places represented by pictures displayed
on a computer screen [38] while a few have used an actual place
[39]. It has been assumed that all such contexts “work” the same
way in learning, and current theoretical models do not
differentiate between them (see [40] for an extended discussion
on context and learning). Our findings here suggest, to the
contrary, that the representational content of context can change
patterns of learning. This further emphasizes the importance of
translating experimental research into the real world in order to
fully use our theoretical knowledge to develop interventions.
Conclusion
The findings of this study show convincingly that when
perceptions of control are measured in relation to an objective
standard, biased estimates of control do correlate with mental
healthiness, with illusory control being the healthiest type of
control (eg, [11,19,36]). Importantly, the simple theoretically
motivated intervention, which was designed to influence
people’s ability to learn about the power of the alternative cause
in contrast to their own control, was effective in increasing
people’s perceptions of being “in control.” Finally, this study
further demonstrates the power of mobile phone technologies
for use in experimental and intervention research. This not only
provides the opportunity to test psychological theory in novel
ways embedded in a person’s everyday environment but also
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